

Advanced Macroeconomics QF: Lecture 8

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In exogenous growth models only technology ${\cal A}$ drives growth in the long run

We assumed that A grows at some rate g over time, where does it come from?

Think of \boldsymbol{A} as ideas of how to combine inputs efficiently:

more / better ideas, higher output per worker

Economics of ideas are different from economics of goods and services:

- Ideas are non-rival: I can use the idea of calculus at the same time as you
- Ideas are (generally) non-exclusive: I cannot stop you from using calculus

That sounds like public goods! But someone needs to invent them in the first place:

- Ideas have high fixed costs: it took a lot of effort to invent calculus or a new drug
- Ideas carry low / zero marginal costs: it costs nothing for you to use calculus now, it costs very little to produce one more pill of a drug

This implies that ideas have increasing returns to scale

Increasing returns to scale implies that the average cost of the idea (or good that embodies the idea) is higher than the marginal cost of reproducing the idea (or good that embodies the idea)

So ideas (or the goods embodying them) will only be produced if someone can charge more than marginal cost

There must be imperfect competition

We'll learn the following endogenous growth models:

- Increasing product variety (horizontal innovation)
- Increasing product quality (vertical innovation)
- Capital accumulation and innovation
- International technology transfer

All models will share the same structure of the economy:

- Households
- Firms
 - Perfectly competitive final goods producers
 - Monopolistic intermediate goods producers (M such firms)
 - · Research and development with free entry

Households

Households' utility maximization problem

$$\max_{\{c_t, a_{t+1}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \frac{c_t^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma}$$
subject to $c_t + (1+n) a_{t+1} = w_t + (1+r_t) a_t + d_t$

Construct the Lagrangian and expand it around the choice variables in t, c_t and a_{t+1}

$$\mathcal{L} = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \frac{c_t^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} + \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \lambda_t \left[w_t + (1+r_t) a_t + d_t - c_t - (1+n) a_{t+1} \right]$$

$$= \dots + \beta^t \frac{c_t^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} + \dots + \beta^t \lambda_t \left[w_t + (1+r_t) a_t + d_t - c_t - (1+n) a_{t+1} \right]$$

$$+ \beta^{t+1} \lambda_{t+1} \left[w_{t+1} + (1+r_{t+1}) a_{t+1} + d_{t+1} - c_{t+1} - (1+n) a_{t+2} \right] + \dots$$

Households

Expanded Lagranian

$$\mathcal{L} = \dots + \beta^{t} \frac{c_{t}^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} + \dots + \beta^{t} \lambda_{t} \left[w_{t} + (1+r_{t}) a_{t} + d_{t} - c_{t} - (1+n) a_{t+1} \right]$$
$$+ \beta^{t+1} \lambda_{t+1} \left[w_{t+1} + (1+r_{t+1}) a_{t+1} + d_{t+1} - c_{t+1} - (1+n) a_{t+2} \right] + \dots$$

First Order Conditions

$$c_{t}: \beta^{t} c_{t}^{-\sigma} - \beta^{t} \lambda_{t} = 0 \qquad \rightarrow \lambda_{t} = c_{t}^{-\sigma}$$

$$a_{t+1}: \beta^{t} \lambda_{t} [-(1+n)] + \beta^{t+1} \lambda_{t+1} (1+r_{t+1}) = 0 \rightarrow \lambda_{t} = \frac{\beta (1+r_{t+1})}{1+n} \lambda_{t+1}$$

Resulting Euler equation $(\beta = \frac{1}{1+\rho})$

$$c_{t}^{-\sigma} = \frac{\beta \left(1 + r_{t+1}\right)}{1 + n} c_{t+1}^{-\sigma} \quad \rightarrow \quad \left(\frac{c_{t+1}}{c_{t}}\right)^{\sigma} = \frac{1 + r_{t+1}}{\left(1 + \rho\right)\left(1 + n\right)} \quad \rightarrow \quad \frac{c_{t+1}}{c_{t}} = \left[\frac{1 + r_{t+1}}{\left(1 + \rho\right)\left(1 + n\right)}\right]^{1/\sigma}$$

Households

Euler equation

$$\frac{c_{t+1}}{c_t} = \left[\frac{1 + r_{t+1}}{(1 + \rho)(1 + n)}\right]^{1/\sigma}$$

Rate of growth of consumption

$$g_c \equiv \frac{\Delta c_{t+1}}{c_t} = \frac{c_{t+1} - c_t}{c_t} = \frac{c_{t+1}}{c_t} - 1$$

$$g_c \simeq \ln(1 + g_c) = \ln\left(\frac{c_{t+1}}{c_t}\right) = \frac{1}{\sigma} \left[\ln(1 + r_{t+1}) - \ln(1 + \rho) - \ln(1 + n)\right] \simeq \frac{r_{t+1} - \rho - n}{\sigma}$$

Along the Balanced Growth Path (BGP)

$$g_c^* \simeq \frac{r - \rho - n}{\sigma}$$

If there is no population growth (n = 0)

$$g_c^* \simeq \frac{r - \rho}{\sigma}$$

Increasing product variety (horizontal innovation)

Increasing product variety (horizontal innovation)

Based on Romer (1990) Endogenous Technological Change

Assume constant population / number of workers ${\cal L}$ The number of intermediate good types ${\cal M}$ grows over time

Production function

$$Y_t = L^{1-\alpha} \sum_{i=1}^{M_t} x_{it}^{\alpha}$$

Profit maximization problem

$$\max_{L, \{x_{it}\}_{i=1}^{M_t}} 1 \cdot L^{1-\alpha} \sum_{i=1}^{M_t} x_{it}^{\alpha} - w_t L - \sum_{i=1}^{M_t} p_{it} x_{it}$$

First Order Conditions

$$\begin{array}{lll} L: & (1-\alpha)\,L^{-\alpha}\sum_{i=1}^{M_t}x_{it}^\alpha-w_t=0 & \rightarrow & w_t=(1-\alpha)\,\frac{Y_t}{L} \\ \\ x_{it}: & L^{1-\alpha}\cdot\alpha x_{it}^{\alpha-1}-p_{it}=0 & \rightarrow & p_{it}=\alpha x_{it}^{\alpha-1}L^{1-\alpha} & \text{and} & x_{it}=(\alpha/p_{it})^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}\,L \end{array}$$

Intermediate goods producers (monopolists)

- One unit of intermediate good is produced from one unit of final good
- The marginal cost of production in the intermediate goods sector is equal to 1
- Profit maximization problem

$$\max_{p_{it}, x_{it}} D_{it} = (p_{it} - 1) x_{it} = p_{it} x_{it} - x_{it}$$
subject to
$$p_{it} = \alpha x_{it}^{\alpha - 1} L^{1 - \alpha}$$

Plug in the inverse demand function

$$\max_{x_{it}} \quad D_{it} = \alpha x_{it}^{\alpha} L^{1-\alpha} - x_{it}$$

First Order Condition

$$x_{it}: \alpha \cdot \underbrace{\alpha x_{it}^{\alpha-1} L^{1-\alpha}}_{p_{it}} - 1 = 0 \rightarrow \alpha p_{it} = 1 \rightarrow p_{it} = \frac{1}{\alpha}$$

Intermediate goods producers (monopolists)

Optimal price and production level

$$p_{it} = \frac{1}{\alpha} > 1$$
 and $x_{it} = \left(\frac{\alpha}{p_{it}}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} L = \left(\alpha^2\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} L = \alpha^{\frac{2}{1-\alpha}} L$

Maximal profit is constant in time and common for all producers

$$D = (p-1) x = \left(\frac{1}{\alpha} - 1\right) \alpha^{\frac{2}{1-\alpha}} L = \left(\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}\right) \alpha^{\frac{2}{1-\alpha}} L \equiv dL$$

Value of the monopolistic firm (along the BGP with constant r)

$$V = \sum_{s=1}^{\infty} \frac{1}{(1+r)^s} D = D \cdot \frac{\frac{1}{1+r}}{1 - \frac{1}{1+r}} = D \cdot \frac{\frac{1}{1+r}}{\frac{r}{1+r}} = \frac{D}{r}$$

Research and development (R&D)

Developing a new variety of intermediate good requires using $1/\eta$ units of final good

Parameter η measures the productivity of the R&D sector

Let ${\cal R}$ denote the amount of resources devoted to R&D, then the number of varieties increases by

$$\Delta M_{t+1} = M_{t+1} - M_t = \eta R_t$$

Free entry condition results in equalization of R&D cost of inventing a single intermediate type with the benefits of "selling" a patent for ${\cal V}$

$$\frac{1}{\eta} = V = \frac{D}{r} \quad \to \quad r = \eta D = \eta dL$$

General Equilibrium and the BGP growth rate

We can now plug the interest rate into the Euler equation to get the BGP growth rate

$$g^* = \frac{r - \rho}{\sigma} = \frac{\eta dL - \rho}{\sigma}$$

BGP growth rate increases with

- the productivity of the R&D sector as measured by the parameter η
- firm profitability d (depending on market structure, here a function of α)
- ullet the size of the economy as measured by labor supply L

and decreases with

- the rate of time preference ho
- the degree of risk aversion σ

Increasing product quality (vertical innovation)

Increasing product quality (vertical innovation)

Based on Aghion and Howitt (1992) A Model of Growth Through Creative Destruction

This time the number of intermediate good types M is constant, but their quality increases over time. Again assume constant population ${\cal L}$

Final goods production function

$$Y_t = L^{1-\alpha} \sum_{i=1}^{M} \left(A_{it}^{1-\alpha} x_{it}^{\alpha} \right)$$

where A_{it} is the quality level of i-th itermediate good at period t

Profit maximization problem

$$\max_{\ell, x_{it}} \quad 1 \cdot L^{1-\alpha} \sum_{i=1}^{M} \left(A_{it}^{1-\alpha} x_{it}^{\alpha} \right) - w_t L - \sum_{i=1}^{M_t} p_{it} x_{it}$$

First Order Condition with respect to x_{it}

$$x_{it}: L^{1-\alpha}A_{it}^{1-\alpha} \cdot \alpha x_{it}^{\alpha-1} - p_{it} = 0 \quad \rightarrow \quad p_{it} = \alpha x_{it}^{\alpha-1} \left(A_{it}L\right)^{1-\alpha}$$

Intermediate goods producers (monopolists)

Profit maximization problem

$$\max_{p_{it}, x_{it}} D_{it} = (p_{it} - 1) x_{it} = p_{it} x_{it} - x_{it}$$
subject to
$$p_{it} = \alpha x_{it}^{\alpha - 1} (A_{it} L)^{1 - \alpha}$$

Plug in the inverse demand function

$$\max_{x_{it}} \quad D_{it} = \alpha x_{it}^{\alpha} \left(A_{it} L \right)^{1-\alpha} - x_{it}$$

First Order Condition

$$x_{it}: \alpha \cdot \underbrace{\alpha x_{it}^{\alpha-1} \left(A_{it}L\right)^{1-\alpha}}_{p_{it}} - 1 = 0 \quad \rightarrow \quad \alpha p_{it} = 1 \quad \rightarrow \quad p_{it} = \frac{1}{\alpha}$$

Optimal production, maximal profit and firm value

$$x_{it} = \alpha^{\frac{2}{1-\alpha}} A_{it} L, \quad D_{it} = \left(\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}\right) \alpha^{\frac{2}{1-\alpha}} A_{it} L \equiv dA_{it} L \quad \text{and} \quad V\left(A_{it}\right) = \frac{dA_{it} L}{r + z_{it}}$$

where z_{it} is the probability of being replaced by a successful innovator

Research and development (R&D)

A successful innovator replaces the monopolist in an industry i and increases the quality of the intermediate good by 1+q, where q>0

$$A'_{i,t+1} = (1+q) A_{it}$$

Success probability z_{it} depends on R&D resources R_{it} , adjusted by the target quality

$$z_{it} = \eta R_{it} / A'_{i,t+1}$$

If successful, the innovator will gain ownership of a firm with quality level $A_{i,t+1}^\prime$

$$V(A'_{i,t+1}) = \frac{dA'_{i,t+1}L}{r + z_{i,t+1}}$$

Expected net benefit of R&D

$$z_{it}V(A'_{i,t+1}) - R_{it} = \frac{\eta R_{it}}{A'_{i,t+1}} \cdot \frac{dA'_{i,t+1}L}{r + z_{i,t+1}} - R_{it}$$

Free entry makes the expected net benefit equal to 0

$$R_{it}\left(\frac{\eta dL}{r+z_{i,t+1}}-1\right)=0 \quad \rightarrow \quad z_{i,t+1}=z=\eta dL-r$$

General Equilibrium

Final goods production function

$$Y_{t} = L^{1-\alpha} \sum_{i=1}^{M} \left(A_{it}^{1-\alpha} x_{it}^{\alpha} \right) = L^{1-\alpha} \sum_{i=1}^{M} \left[A_{it}^{1-\alpha} \left(\alpha^{\frac{2}{1-\alpha}} A_{it} L \right)^{\alpha} \right] = \alpha^{\frac{2\alpha}{1-\alpha}} L \sum_{i=1}^{M} A_{it} \equiv \alpha^{\frac{2\alpha}{1-\alpha}} L A_{t}$$

where A is the aggregate productivity (in the increasing variety model A=M)

Dynamics of aggregate quality / productivity (in expectation)

$$E[A_{t+1}] = \sum_{i=1}^{M} E[A_{i,t+1}] = \sum_{i=1}^{M} [z(1+q)A_{it} + (1-z)A_{it}] = (1+zq)\sum_{i=1}^{M} A_{it} = (1+zq)A_{t}$$

$$E[g_{A}] = \frac{E[\Delta A_{t+1}]}{A_{t}} = \frac{(1+zq)A_{t} - A_{t}}{A_{t}} = zq$$

General Equilibrium

Solve the system of equations

$$\begin{cases} \sigma g = r - \rho & \text{Euler equation} \\ r = \eta dL - z & \text{R\&D free entry} \\ z = g/q & \text{Expected productivity dynamics} \end{cases}$$

Solution

$$\begin{split} \sigma g &= \eta dL - g/q - \rho &&\to \left(\sigma + 1/q\right)g = \eta dL - \rho \\ g &= \frac{\eta dL - \rho}{\sigma + 1/q} \\ z &= \frac{\eta dL - \rho}{\sigma q + 1} \quad \text{and} \quad r = \frac{\rho + \sigma q \eta dL}{\sigma q + 1} \end{split}$$

BGP growth rate

$$g^* = \frac{\eta dL - \rho}{\sigma + 1/q}$$

BGP growth rate increases with

- ullet the productivity of the R&D sector as measured by the parameter η
- firm profitability d (depending on market structure, here a function of α)
- ullet the size of the economy as measured by labor supply L
- ullet the size of the innovative step q

and decreases with

- the rate of time preference ρ
- the degree of risk aversion σ

Since in the data we do not observe "strong" scale effects (economies with larger ${\cal L}$ don't grow faster), we will eliminate them going forward

Capital accumulation and innovation

Capital accumulation and innovation

Based on Aghion and Howitt (1999) The Economics of Growth, chapter 5.4

This time we allow for population change at some rate n

Intermediate goods are interpreted as capital transformed into particular "machines"

We allow for both (simplified) horizontal and vertical innovation

Horizontal innovation is random: each worker invents a new machine with probablity ψ and existing types stop being produced with probability ϵ (disruptive innovation)

The resulting BGP level of employment per machine type is

$$\ell^* = \frac{\epsilon + n}{\psi}$$

Final goods producers (perfectly competitive)

Production function

$$Y_t = (L_t/M_t)^{1-\alpha} \sum_{i=1}^{M_t} A_{it}^{1-\alpha} x_{it}^{\alpha} \equiv \ell_t^{1-\alpha} \sum_{i=1}^{M_t} A_{it}^{1-\alpha} x_{it}^{\alpha}$$

where $\ell \equiv L/M$ denotes employment per "machine" type

Profit maximization problem

$$\max_{\ell_t, x_{it}} \quad 1 \cdot \ell_t^{1-\alpha} \sum_{i=1}^{M} \left(A_{it}^{1-\alpha} x_{it}^{\alpha} \right) - w_t \ell_t M_t - \sum_{i=1}^{M_t} p_{it} x_{it}$$

First Order Condition with respect to x_{it}

$$x_{it}: \quad \ell_t^{1-\alpha} A_{it}^{1-\alpha} \cdot \alpha x_{it}^{\alpha-1} - p_{it} = 0 \quad \to \quad p_{it} = \alpha \left(A_{it} \ell_t \right)^{1-\alpha} x_{it}^{\alpha-1}$$

Demand function for *i*-th "machine" $x_{it} = \left(\alpha/p_{it}\right)^{1/(1-\alpha)} A_{it} \ell_t$

Intermediate goods producers (monopolists)

This time the marginal cost of production is given by the rental rate of capital r_t^k

Profit maximization problem

$$\max_{p_{it}, x_{it}} D_{it} = (p_{it} - r_t^k) x_{it} = p_{it} x_{it} - r_t^k x_{it}$$
subject to
$$p_{it} = \alpha (A_{it} \ell_t)^{1-\alpha} x_{it}^{\alpha-1}$$

Plug in the inverse demand function

$$\max_{x_{it}} D_{it} = \alpha \left(A_{it} \ell_t \right)^{1-\alpha} x_{it}^{\alpha} - r_t^k x_{it}$$

First Order Conditions

$$x_{it}: \alpha \cdot \alpha \left(A_{it}\ell_{t}\right)^{1-\alpha} x_{it}^{\alpha-1} - r_{t}^{k} = 0 \quad \rightarrow \quad \alpha p_{it} = r_{t}^{k} \quad \rightarrow \quad p_{it} = \frac{r_{t}^{k}}{\alpha}$$

Optimal level of production

$$x_{it} = \left(\frac{\alpha}{r_t^k/\alpha}\right)^{1/(1-\alpha)} A_{it} \ell_t = \left(\alpha^2/r_t^k\right)^{1/(1-\alpha)} A_{it} \ell_t$$

Capital market equilibrium

Aggregate production of "machines" cannot exceed the accumulated capital K

$$K_{t} = \sum_{i=1}^{M_{t}} x_{it} = \sum_{i=1}^{M_{t}} \left(\alpha^{2}/r_{t}^{k}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} A_{it} \ell_{t} = \left(\alpha^{2}/r_{t}^{k}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} L_{t} \cdot \frac{1}{M_{t}} \sum_{i=1}^{M_{t}} A_{it} \equiv \left(\alpha^{2}/r_{t}^{k}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} A_{t} L_{t}$$

This time A is the simple average of industry-level product quality

Capital rental rate depends negatively on the level of capital per effective labor $\hat{k} \equiv K/\left(AL\right)$

$$K_t = \left(\alpha^2/r_t^k\right)^{1/(1-\alpha)} A_t L_t \quad \to \quad \hat{k}_t = \left(\alpha^2/r_t^k\right)^{1/(1-\alpha)} \quad \to \quad r_t^k = \alpha^2 \hat{k}_t^{\alpha-1}$$

Optimal production level can be expressed as

$$x_{it} = \left[\alpha^2 / (\alpha^2 \hat{k}_t^{\alpha - 1})\right]^{1/(1 - \alpha)} A_{it} \ell_t = (\hat{k}_t^{1 - \alpha})^{1/(1 - \alpha)} A_{it} \ell_t = A_{it} \ell_t \hat{k}_t$$

Final goods production function becomes the familiar Cobb-Douglas one

$$Y_{t} = \left(\frac{L_{t}}{M_{t}}\right)^{1-\alpha} \sum_{t=0}^{M_{t}} A_{it}^{1-\alpha} \left(A_{it} \frac{L_{t}}{M_{t}} \hat{k}_{t}\right)^{\alpha} = \hat{k}_{t}^{\alpha} L_{t} \cdot \frac{1}{M_{t}} \sum_{t=0}^{M_{t}} A_{it} = \hat{k}_{t}^{\alpha} L_{t} A_{t} = K_{t}^{\alpha} \left(A_{t} L_{t}\right)^{1-\alpha}$$

Research and development (R&D)

Maximal profit depends positively on \hat{k} , via reduction of costs of production

$$D_{it} = \left(\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}\right) r_t^k x_{it} = \left(\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}\right) \alpha^2 \hat{k}_t^{\alpha-1} \cdot A_{it} \ell_t \hat{k}_t = \left(1-\alpha\right) \alpha \hat{k}_t^{\alpha} \cdot A_{it} \ell_t \equiv d(\hat{k}_t) A_{it} \ell_t$$

Value of the firm producing the i-th machine along the BGP

$$V^* (A_{it}) = \frac{d(\hat{k}^*) A_{it} \ell^*}{r(\hat{k}^*) + \epsilon + z^*} = \frac{d(\hat{k}^*) A_{it} \ell^*}{r^k (\hat{k}^*) - \delta + \epsilon + z^*}$$

Vertical innovations lead to improvements of "machine" quality by q and their probability depends on R&D expenditure adjusted by target quality: $z_{it} = \eta R_{it}/A'_{i,t+1}$

Free entry condition equalizes the expected net benefits of R&D to 0

$$z_{it}V^* (A'_{i,t+1}) - R_{it} = \frac{\eta R_{it}}{A'_{i,t+1}} \cdot \frac{d(\hat{k}^*)A'_{i,t+1}\ell^*}{r(\hat{k}^*) + \epsilon + z^*} - R_{it} = R_{it} \left[\frac{\eta d(\hat{k}^*)\ell^*}{r(\hat{k}^*) + \epsilon + z^*} - 1 \right] = 0$$
$$z^* = \eta d(\hat{k}^*)\ell^* - \epsilon - r(\hat{k}^*)$$

Balanced Growth Path General Equilibrium

BGP growth rate g^* depends positively on \hat{k}^* (GG curve)

$$g^* = z^* q = q \left[\eta d(\hat{k}^*) \ell^* - r(\hat{k}^*) \right] = q \left[\eta \left(1 - \alpha \right) \alpha (\hat{k}^*)^{\alpha} \cdot \frac{\epsilon + n}{\psi} - \epsilon - \left(\alpha^2 (\hat{k}^*)^{\alpha - 1} - \delta \right) \right]$$

Higher capital per effective labor \hat{k}^* means higher profits and lower interest rates

In turn \hat{k}^* depends negatively on g^* : from the Euler equation we get


$$g_c^* = g^* = \frac{r - \rho - n}{\sigma} = \frac{\alpha^2 (\hat{k}^*)^{\alpha - 1} - \delta - \rho - n}{\sigma}$$

KK curve

$$\hat{k}^* = \left(\frac{\alpha^2}{\rho + \delta + n + \sigma g^*}\right)^{1/(1-\alpha)}$$

Higher population growth rate n can be beneficial in the long run through GG

Model dynamics



Whenever $\hat{k}<\hat{k}^*$, the rate of growth of productivity is $0\leq g< g^*$ Initially capital accumulation is the main driver of growth Improvements in productivity become increasingly more important and in the long run are the sole driver of GDP per worker growth

Economic growth in the very long run



Adding the "minimal" consumption (Stone-Geary) makes convergence to BGP slow:

- slow capital accumulation
- slow increase in productivity (even stagnation), growing number of "brains"
- initial innovation "accidental" (scientific revolution: $A \uparrow$ and $\eta \uparrow$), only later we get industrial innovation (industrial revolution), 20th century is BGP

James Watt's steam engine patent from 1769



A.D. 1769 Nº 918.

Steam Engines, &c.

WATT'S SPECIFICATION.

TO ALL TO WHOM THESE PRESENTS SHALL COME, I, JAMES WAYP, of Glavere, in Societal, Manchant, and smeather

Warris of Olsagow, in sociolosis, steedant, soci preving:
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Kingform of Great Beits and the Expert Light December of Wiss, and Town.

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the date of the said recited Letters Painer, as in and by the said Letters Patent, and the Statists in that behalf made, relations being thereunto respectively had, now more or large spone.

10 NOW XNOW TE, that in compliance with the said province, and in pursuance of the said Statists. I. the said Jones West, the hearter decision that the

a A.D. 1769.—N* 913.

Watt's Method of Leaening the Communication of Steem & Field in Fire Enginee.

following is a particular description of the nature of my said Invention, and of the namer in which the same is to be performed (that is to say);...

My method of lessening the consumption of steam, and consequently fuel, in fire engines consists of the following principles:—

First, that seased is which the process of stream ten to be employed to varie, & the origin, which is doubt the optime in common few sequion, and which I call the steam would, must during the whole time the appier is at work to pay as had in the term that stream is, that y sentinging it in a soon of would be a second or any other materials that story; a sensiting by surrounding; it will known or the factors below in the little, by suffering on the case of would not seen to be a second or such a second or any other materials that story; a sensiting by surrounding; it will known or the factors to below, and theirly, by suffering soulders wange 10 or any other substances collect than the stream to enter or touch it during that these.

Secolly, in engines that are to be weeked vehily or partially by confounation of abouts, the steam is to be conducted in wantils distinst from the steam vasadis or sylinters, shibringh ossesionally communicating with them. Those 10vosadis I and conformers, and whilst the engines are working, those ondenous cought not teast to be kept as cold as the sir in the neighbourhood of the nonlinear low models of water each solid series.

Thirdly, whatever air or other electic vapour is not condensed by the cold of the condenser, and may impede the working of the engine, is to be drawn. 20 out of this storm vossells or condensers, by means of pumps wrought by the enginess themselves, or otherwise.

Founds, I totated in many cases to employ the expansive force of steam to great on the principles, we believe may be used intend of them, in the arms mentor at the presence of the stanophere in new complexed in common the 80 engines. In the standard control of the stand

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A D 1760 -Nº 913

War's Melad of Leaesing the Consequence of Steam of Peak in Fire Engine, weights are pressed, but not in the centerary. As the steam result mores round it is supplied with steam from the believ, and that which has performed the offers may either the indisapply by means of constances rot to the open air. Skithy, I latered in come cause to apply a degree of eak not coupable of a solution that states to waite, but of contrasting its constantings, as that the

engines shall be worked by the absentate expension and construction of the steem.

Lastly, instead of using water to render the piston or other parts of the surgious air and steam sight, I coupley cits, wax, restowas bedies, fat of satissals, the notestown and other mostles, in their fault state.

In witness whereof, I have become set my hand and seal, this Twentyfifth day of April, is the year of our Lard One thousand seven hundred

and skty-time.

JAMES WATT. (c.s.)

15 Scaled and delivered in the presence of
Coat. Wilking.

GRO, JAROUNE.

JOHN ROMPICK.

Bo it remembered, that the said James Watt doth not inited that any to thing in the frurth article shall be understood to extend to any engine where the water to be raised enters the steam record itself, or any recent having an onese communication with

JAMES WATE.

Witnesse, 25 Coll. Wilder, Geo. Janese.

AND DE 1Y ERMEMBERED, that on the Twesty-dish day of Apid, in the year of our Level 176 hts absonaid James West owns before our said [a Level the King is Blic Channer, and sharowledged the Specialism information, a post of all and every daing therein extincted and specified, in firms above without, a Challes the Specialism information as tamport executing the theore of the Simular mode in the sixth year of the reign of the lote King and Queen Cl. William and Mary C England, and so forth.

Intelled the Twenty-night day of April, in the year of our Lord One thousand seren hundred and sixty-miss.

LONDON:

Printed by GEORGE EDWARD ETER and WILLIAM SPOTTESWOODE,

Printers to the Groun's most Excellent Majorie, 1875.


Wikimedia Commons

Patents awarder during the industrial revolution

Number of patents awarded through the industrial revolution, 1700 to 1851




The annual number of patents awarded across all industries and sectors in England, Scotland and Ireland across the period of the Industrial Revolution (1700-1852).



Source: Bottomley, S. (2014).



Advanced economies are innovation leaders



International technology transfer

Based on Aghion and Howitt (1999) The Economics of Growth, chapter 7.2

For simplicity assume constant number of machines M

Assume two groups of countries: technology leaders and technology followers

- Technology leaders invent new technologies: their rate of growth is explained by the previous model and is denoted with \bar{g}
- Technology followers adopt / imitate the leading technologies

Probability of successful adoption / imitation of leading technology $ar{A}$ is z

$$A_{i,t+1} = \begin{cases} \bar{A}_{it} & \text{with probability} \quad z\\ A_{it} & \text{with probability} \quad 1-z \end{cases}$$

Higher z translates to higher productivity growth

$$A_{t+1} = \frac{1}{M} \sum_{i=1}^{M} A_{i,t+1} = \frac{1}{M} \sum_{i=1}^{M} \left[z \bar{A}_{it} + (1-z) A_{it} \right] = z \frac{1}{M} \sum_{i=1}^{M} \bar{A}_{it} + (1-z) \frac{1}{M} \sum_{i=1}^{M} A_{it}$$

$$A_{t+1} = z \bar{A}_{t} + (1-z) A_{t}$$

Proximity to technology frontier

Proximity to technology frontier $a_t \equiv A_t/\bar{A}_t$

Dynamics of proximity

$$A_{t+1} = z\bar{A}_t + (1-z)A_t \quad | \quad : \bar{A}_t$$

$$\frac{A_{t+1}}{\bar{A}_t} = \frac{A_{t+1}}{\bar{A}_{t+1}} \frac{\bar{A}_{t+1}}{\bar{A}_t} = z + (1-z)\frac{A_t}{\bar{A}_t} = z + (1-z)a_t$$

$$a_{t+1} (1+\bar{g}) = z + (1-z)a_t$$

$$a_{t+1} = \frac{z + (1-z)a_t}{1+\bar{g}}$$

BGP proximity

$$a^* (1 + \bar{g}) = z + (1 - z) a^*$$

$$a^* (\bar{g} + z) = z$$

$$a^* = \frac{z}{z + \bar{g}} < 1$$

Proximity to technology frontier and growth

BGP growth rate of technology followers is also $ar{g}$

$$g = \frac{A_{t+1} - A_t}{A_t} - 1 = \frac{z\bar{A}_t + (1-z)A_t}{A_t} - 1 = \frac{z}{a^*} + (1-z) - 1 = \bar{g} + z - z = \bar{g}$$

Before they converge to BGP, tech followers grow faster ("advantage of backwardness")

$$q_t \equiv \frac{\bar{A}_t - A_t}{A_t} = \frac{1}{a_t} - 1 \ge \frac{1}{a^*} - 1$$
$$g_t = zq_t = z\left(\frac{1}{a_t} - 1\right) \ge \bar{g}$$

Domestic $z=\eta d(\hat{k})\ell-r(\hat{k})$ does not determine growth rate, but **relative GDP per worker**


Determinants of country "rank" in world GDP per worker distribution

- R&D productivity η (quantity and quality of human capital, top universities)
- ullet Firm profitability d (efficient bureaucratic and legal system, no corruption)
- ullet Financing conditions r (efficient equity markets, access to venture capital funds)

Innovation activity in the European Union



Advanced economies grow together, but persistently differ in \overline{y}



FRED 33